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By Ludwig van den Hauwe, Ph.D.
Abstract
Gary Beckers paper about free banking written in 1956 was originally 
intended as a reaction to the 100-percent reserve proposals that were 
then popular at the University of Chicago. Today the original paper 
clearly illustrates how considerably our views and theories about free 
banking have evolved in the past 50 years. This development is to a 
considerable extent the result of the work and the writings of 
economists of the Austrian School. Pascal Salin is one of the most 
prominent members of the Austrian free banking school. In a new 
introduction to this 1956 paper written especially for the Festschrift in 
honor of Pascal Salin, Gary Becker partly repudiates and mitigates 
some of his previous conclusions. This event offers a fitting 
opportunity to review some developments in the theory of free banking 
and related issues and to add a few clarifications concerning the 
present “state of the art” as regards an acceptable and adequate
concept of free banking. 
I. Introduction
The recently edited Festschrift in honor of Pascal Salin1 is a 
highly varied and disparate collection of contributions by colleagues, 
admirers and friends of the famous French professor of the Universit 
Paris-Dauphine, ranging over a wide variety of subject matters, from 
personal testimonies and reflections about the methodology of the 
social sciences to contributions about the relationship between 
liberalism and Christianity and a plea on behalf of the liberalization of 
African economies, besides more conventional topics such as the 
economic analysis of taxation and the theory of money and banking.
As such the book, which abundantly illustrates the wide-ranging 
intellectual interests and accomplishments of the French professor, 
constitutes a publication event of the greatest significance. It is 
probably hardly necessary to present the world-renowned professor 
even to a non-French public.2 In this contribution I will offer a few 
critical comments concerning one of the most remarkable 
2contributions contained in the book, which is a paper by Nobel Prize 
winning economist Gary S. Becker entitled Free Banking (ibid. 227-
234). 
It has been an apt initiative to include this paper into the 
Festschrift. As is well known among specialists, Pascal Salins role in 
the diffusion of ideas related to currency competition and free banking 
has been seminal since years. 3
In the new introduction to the paper written especially for the 
Festschrift in honor of Pascal Salin, Gary Becker points out that he 
wrote this paper on free banking in 1956 as a reaction to the 100-
percent reserve proposals that were then popular, especially at the 
University of Chicago and that he intended to argue, basically, that a 
100-percent reserve system requirement is an undesirable regulation 
since the banking industry was already overregulated. He also adds 
that the paper obviously needs a thorough rewriting, in particular to 
bring the treatment of macroeconomic policy up to date. 
The paper is a short one (8 pages) but it is nevertheless 
significant. It is interesting and important because it illustrates how 
far the views and theses of the Chicago School were originally removed 
from those of the Austrian School when it comes to the theoretical 
analysis of monetary and banking matters, and to some degree it also
illustrates how considerably the debate and theses about free banking 
have evolved during the past fifty years. Both with respect to the 
definition of free banking, and with respect to the hypothesized 
working characteristics of this institution, Beckers original paper 
made a number of claims which today appear quite remarkable from a 
more truly free banking perspective. In his new introduction to the
original 1956 paper, Becker partially repudiates or mitigates his 
previous conclusions regarding free banking. This event offers a fitting 
opportunity to review some recent developments in the theory of free 
banking and to add a few clarifications about the present “state of the 
art” concerning an acceptable concept of free banking. 
3II. Gary Beckers definition of free banking
Beckers original 1956 proposal for free banking 
contained the following ingredients:
1. The Federal Government will retain its monopoly of the printing of 
currency or notes.
2. Otherwise there will be essentially free banking. Banks will be free 
to set themselves up and establish their own reserve ratios, interest 
rates, lending policies, and so on. That is, banking will be considered 
an industry like any other, and competition rather than Government 
will be the controlling mechanism. 
3. There will be some overall countercyclical policy. The leading idea is 
that the proper role of Government in combating cyclical movements 
is through overall, general policies and not through specific ones.
Becker distinguishes his own proposal from two other kinds of 
schemes:
- The 100-percent reserve scheme as usually presented which 
provides for 100-percent reserves against deposits subject to check, 
and government monopoly of the note issue.
- A kind of scheme which Becker characterizes as “the present 
intermediate position” and which he considers the least desirable of 
the three.
In the remainder of the present paper I will take a critical look 
at the three ingredients which according to Beckers original proposal
define a free banking system. 
4III. Does free banking require a government monopoly of the currency 
or note issue?
In the new introduction to his 1956 paper written for the 
Festschrift, Becker points out that he had originally been bothered by 
his conclusion that the Federal government should retain a monopoly 
over currency and that he had only reluctantly accepted the at that 
time common argument that the supply of notes would increase 
without bound if they were issued only by a competitive banking 
system. In view of what are now known as possible solutions of the 
durable goods problem – but which were not known 50 years ago –
Becker now agrees that private bank money may be feasible.
As regards the first ingredient of his scheme, Becker had 
originally provided the following rationale:
“Competitive private enterprise alone cannot provide this currency, for 
profit incentives would reduce this to a pure commodity standard. In 
other words, the equilibrium price level would be infinity. This implies 
that a finite, relatively stable price level can be maintained only if the 
government issues notes.” (ibid. 229)
A footnote accompanying this passage refers to M. Friedman, without 
indicating any of Friedmans writings more specifically. In his A 
Program for Monetary Stability (Friedman 1960), Milton Friedman had 
asked the question “whether monetary and banking arrangements 
cannot be left to the market, subject only to the general rules applying
to all other economic activity (…)” (ibid. 4) and he had listed a number 
of “good reasons” why monetary arrangements have seldom been left 
to the market. (ibid. 8)
One of these “good reasons” relates to what Milton Friedman referred 
to as “the technical monopoly character of a pure fiduciary currency 
5which makes essential the setting of some external limit on its amount 
(...)”. (ibid. 8)
And in this respect he had indeed argued that:
“So long as the fiduciary currency has a market value greater than its 
cost of production – which under favorable conditions can be 
compressed close to the cost of the paper on which it is printed – any 
individual issuer has an incentive to issue additional amounts. A 
fiduciary currency would thus probably tend through increased issue 
to degenerate into a commodity currency – into a literal paper 
standard – there being no stable equilibrium price level short of that 
at which the money value of currency is no greater than that of the 
paper it contains. And in view of the negligible cost of adding zeros, it 
is not clear that there is any finite price level for which this is the 
case.” (ibid. 7)
As Becker points out in the introduction to the paper, the problems 
raised by the incentives of private banks to continue to issue money 
until prices measured in these currency units become infinite are
related to the so-called “Coase conjecture” (Coase 1972), or the 
problem of pricing of durable goods over time by a monopolist.
As a monopolist continues to produce a durable over time, his past 
production competes against his current production. This raises the 
supply over time, and with a given demand function, forces down 
price over time. Eventually, prices reach the monoplists cost of 
production, and he no longer makes any profits.
As Becker pursues:
“There is an exact correspondence with money supply creation by a 
private bank. As the bank creates a new supply of money each period, 
this flow competes against the supply created in prior periods, and the 
6total stock rises over time – ignoring any physical depreciation in the 
stock. As the stock continues to rise, the value of this banks money 
falls until it reaches the cost of producing more of its money, which I 
take as approximately zero. Then prices in terms of this money are 
infinite, and the conclusion in the text follows.” (ibid. 228)
In Beckers own scheme an infinite equilibrium price level would be 
avoided because checking institutions with demand liabilities would 
contract to convert deposits on demand into government notes (or 
currency). The possibility of conversion would induce banks to hold 
some of their assets in currency. The necessity of converting deposits 
into government notes leads to a finite nominal value of deposits, and 
hence to a finite price level. (230) 
Under imperfect foresight, which Becker indeed assumes (ibid. 
229-230), the traditional approach to preventing a profit-maximizing 
private issuer from hyperinflating is indeed to write a contract 
obligating the issuer to buy back his money at a pre-determined price, 
i.e. a redemption contract. At least for money, redemption contracts 
would be cheap to write and enforce, or so it appears. (White 1999, 
239)
The technical monopoly character of a pure fiduciary currency 
to which Milton Friedman had made reference had been questioned in 
a much cited paper by Benjamin Klein. (Klein 1974) Kleins theoretical 
case rested on the necessity for a producer of money to establish 
confidence in his money, and the increasing capital cost of creating
such confidence. Several critics had raised doubts, however, about 
whether Kleins argument can be carried over to a pure fiduciary
currency. Historically, producers of money have established 
confidence by promising convertibility into some dominant money, 
typically specie. (see e.g. Friedman and Schwartz 1986 (1987))
In accordance with the so-called “Coase conjecture” (Coase 
1972) a contractual arrangement of the sort embodied in a redemption 
contract remains essential if a producer, who is selling a good above 
7its marginal cost of physical production, wants to make it credible 
that he will not later drive the resale value down by selling more at a 
lower price. (also White 1999, 239) It does not yet follow, however, 
that a government monopoly on the note or currency issue is indeed 
necessary to ensure a finite equilibrium price level. Arguments of this 
sort predate not only the durable goods literature but also the Public 
Choice revolution and the revival of the Austrian School including the 
Free Banking School; they also ignore the now extensive literature 
concerning the inflationary bias and the effects of time inconsistency 
under a discretionary central banking regime and concerning the 
dynamics of possible hyperinflation under central banking.4
A quarter of a century after Milton Friedman had considered the 
reasons for government involvement in monetary matters, he and 
Anna Schwartz reconsidered the same question in a paper entitled 
Has Government Any Role in Money? (Friedman and Schwartz 1986) 
and which clearly reflects the changed climate of opinion at that 
moment. According to Friedman and Schwartz the burst of renewed 
scholarly interest in various aspects of monetary reform was a 
response to several developments. In particular they mentioned the 
emergence of the theory of public choice and of the rational-
expectations approach and the renewed interest in Austrian 
economics, with its emphasis on “invisible hand” interpretations of the 
origin and development of economic institutions, and its interpretation 
of the business cycle as largely reflecting the effect of non-neutral 
money. (ibid. 499-500)  As a significant external development they 
also mentioned the emergence of a world monetary system which
they characterized as unprecedented: a system in which essentially 
every currency in the world is, directly or indirectly, on a pure fiat 
standard. (ibid. 500)
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz concluded in their 1986 
paper that “the possibility that private issuers can (…) provide 
competing, efficient, and safe fiduciary currencies with no role for 
governmental monetary authorities remains to be demonstrated (…)” 
8(ibid. 520) but they also concurred, despite their critique of the 
proposal made by Benjamin Klein, that his argument “would not seem 
to preclude the simultaneous existence in the same community of 
several dominant moneys produced by different private issuers.” (ibid. 
507)
The proposal made by the advocates of a system of fractional-
reserve free banking (see e.g. Selgin and White 1996] seems to comply
with both desiderata, on the one hand the decentralized, competitive 
nature of the processes of the supply of inside money, and thus the 
total absence of any government role in the supply of inside money, 
and on the other hand the requirement of a possibility of redemption 
in an outside (base) money, in accordance with Coases conjecture.
It is important to realize, however, that fractional-reserve free banking 
by itself does not uniquely specify the base money regime. The money-
supply implications of free banking are distinct from the implications 
of any particular monetary standard. (Selgin and White 1996, 19)
As Selgin and White explain:
“Base money could be gold or silver, as would be consistent with the 
evolution of a monetary system in which government had never 
intervened. Or it could be some fiat money, with the stock of fiat 
money permanently frozen (or otherwise determined by a strict rule) to 
eliminate any scope for discretionary monetary policy.” (ibid. 19)
Both Becker and fractional-reserve free bankers Selgin and White 
believe that given a particular base money regime and given a 
possibility of conversion or redemption of inside money into outside
money in accordance with the Coase conjecture, the nominal value of 
the money stock and of the price level will be finite.  
Whereas Beckers original argument was unambiguously in 
favor of a government monopoly of the supply of base money (currency 
or notes in Beckers original proposal), fractional-reserve free bankers 
9Selgin and White seem to consider such a monopoly a possible and 
acceptable option among other options but apparently do not believe 
that a serious free banking proposal should be expected to take a 
definite stance on this issue. Therefore they go on:
“For this reason we do not discuss here the money-supply properties 
of any particular base money regime.” (ibid. 19)
The conclusion that the possibility (for market participants) and
the necessity (for the banks) of converting or redeeming deposits in 
some base money – such as government notes or currency in Beckers 
original proposal – would indeed contribute to ensuring a finite 
equilibrium price level can be granted. Whether this condition is also 
sufficient, however, would still depend upon the plausibility of the 
hypotheses we can formulate with respect to the conditions of supply 
(and with respect to the quantities supplied) of base money itself. 
Moreover base money brings in problems of itself. Insecure linkage of 
ordinary money to reserve or base money has often impeded the 
smooth working of modern monetary systems. (Yeager 2001)
Therefore this author does not agree with the suggestion of 
Selgin and White that a serious free banking proposal can remain 
silent about this issue, and in particular concerning the properties 
and hypothesized working characteristics of different conceivable base 
money regimes. A consistent and serious free banking proposal
should not simply assume that, given a central monetary authority 
supplying base money in the form of fiat money, the stock of fiat 
money is permanently frozen, or that it is determined by a strict rule, 
or that there is no scope for discretionary monetary policy etc. 
The realism of any such assumptions is disputable on both historical 
and theoretical grounds.5
The considerations which raise serious doubts not only about 
Becker s original plea in favor of a government monopoly of the 
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currency issue but also about Selgin´s and White´s agnostic attitude 
with respect to the desirable base money regime are at least threefold:
(a) Public Choice considerations:
A central bank which is capable of influencing the amount of 
credit expansion effectuated by the monetary system will not be 
immune from the actions and initiatives of pressure groups lobbying 
for the benefits accompanying such credit expansion. The benefits to 
be derived from credit expansion may tend to be relatively more 
concentrated, that is, directed towards identifiable groups, than the 
costs of credit expansion which may be largely diffused among the 
general public. Public choice analysis, especially Olson´s, has revealed 
that it is easier to form an interest group when the number of 
potential members is small than when the number is large. (Olson
1971) A central bank may thus typically face incentives to pursue 
goals other than the low inflation desired by the public; monetary 
authorities may be led to pursue a political agenda, contrary to the 
interests of the average citizen etc.
(b) The literature on Rules versus Discretion
In the wake of a number of contributions exploring the role of 
dynamic inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 
1983a, 1983b) the debate on monetary policy and the appropriate role 
of central banks has for decades been dominated by discussions 
concerning the relative desirability of rules versus discretion as 
different possible approaches. With reference to monetary policy, the 
general idea is rather straightforward: a central bank seeking to 
manipulate the economy into the best combination of inflation and 
unemployment through discretionary policy, may find out that its 
options are so limited that discretion turns out to be a trap, when it 
faces a public that understands the game.
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These models show that discretionary “optimal control” policy, 
with period-by-period decision making, can fail to attain the best 
attainable outcome even when there is no knowledge problem, and no 
malincentive problem. A sub-optimal outcome occurs, even if the 
monetary authority can perfectly predict the timing, and magnitude, 
of the effects of changes in money growth on the inflation and 
unemployment rates, and has a preference function identical to the 
publics. The reason for the ill effect of discretionary policy, is that 
agents with rational expectations respond to prospective changes in 
monetary policy, revising their inflation-rate expectations accordingly. 
A change in the expected inflation rate alters the parameters of the 
policy-makers decision problem, and calls for further adjustments to 
policy. The sequence of such conjectural changes converges on a sub-
optimal outcome. The outcome is sub-optimal because, in period-by-
period decisions taking the discretionary regime and its associated 
rational expectations as given, the policy-maker cannot internalize the 
effect that the policy regime itself has on expectations, and, thereby, 
on the decisions of agents. Discretion results in sub-optimality 
because there is, in the nature of the case, no way to induce future 
policy-makers to consider the effect of their likely discretionary policy, 
via expectations, on the decisions of current agents; and there is no 
way to convince perceptive agents, today, that if they were to expect a 
long-run optimal policy (zero inflation) to prevail tomorrow, they will 
not be cheated when tomorrow arrives, by the choice of what then 
seems the best policy (positive inflation). Some sort of rules or binding 
precommitments are needed to internalize the externality from 
unconstrained future policy. (see also White 1999, Chapter 10)
The analysis of time inconsistency in monetary policy has been 
important for at least two reasons. First, it forces us to examine the 
actual incentives faced by the central bank. The time-inconsistency 
literature contrasts sharply with the older tradition in monetary policy 
in which the policy-maker was simply assumed to follow an arbitrary 
or perhaps optimal rule. The newer view stresses that policy-makers 
12
may face incentives to deviate from such rules. Probably the most 
important contribution of the literature on time inconsistency has 
thus been to provide a theoretical framework for thinking formally 
about credibility issues, on the one hand, and about the role of 
institutions and political factors, on the other, in influencing policy 
choices. 
Second, to the extent dynamic inconsistency is important, 
models that help us to understand the incentives faced by policy-
makers and the nature of the decision problems they face are 
important for the normative task of designing policy-making 
institutions. In order to influence efforts at reform and redesign of 
society´s monetary institutions, monetary economists need models 
that help in understanding how institutional structures actually affect 
policy outcomes. From the perspective adopted here it will be noted 
that the proposals for reform of our monetary institutions which have 
resulted from this literature have nevertheless remained extremely 
limited.6
It is the great merit of Pascal Salin to have had the courage to 
push the analysis beyond the conventional boundaries. In an 
important critical note concerning Bennett T. McCallum (1988) and 
Alan S. Blinder (1988) Pascal Salin has pointed out that the usual 
ranking, even if it involves some useful distinctions such as the 
differences between simple rules and complex rules and the 
differences between rules concerning instruments and rules 
concerning outcomes, is actually a partial ordering of a wider class of 
possibilities.  In particular the more fundamental distinction is the 
distinction between rules of just conduct and commands, i.e., rules 
commanding a result.
Adding this distinction between rules of just conduct and rules 
imposing a result, the classification ought to be the following:
1 Rules of just conduct
13
2 Rules of result (specific commands)
2A simple rules
a instrument-based rules
b outcome-based rules
2B complex rules (close to 3 – discretion)
3 Discretion
Policies have to be evaluated according to (1) the extent to which they 
are respectful of property rights and (2) their capacity to give reliable 
information. Considering first-best solutions a feasible option, a rule 
of just conduct in the field of macroeconomic policy would then imply, 
for instance, a practicable variant of currency competition. 
Considering, however, that we live in a second-best world where the 
production of money is monopolized by the State, rules are better than 
discretion, and instrument-based rules are preferable to outcome-
based rules. (see Salin 1988a)
(c) The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle:
Gary Becker does not mention the Austrian theory of the 
business cycle and perhaps he has reasons, which are left implicit, to 
reject it or not to consider it a valid account of cyclical movements in 
the economy. A possible different explanation of the lack of any 
reference by Becker to Austrian economics probably resides in the fact 
that his original article predates the revival of Austrian economics by 
almost twenty years. Nevertheless the Austrian theory of the business 
cycle contains a more or less explicit argument against money and 
credit creation by a central bank, and this argument, since it is 
conceived from within a peculiar scientific framework, is distinct from 
the two previous arguments. 
There are reasons to believe that central-bank monetary policy, 
even under a non-discretionary rules-based regime, will yield sub-
14
optimal outcomes. These reasons can be grasped from the perspective 
of an altogether different theoretical framework.
Under central banking, the banking system demands money 
issued by the central bank - known as “base money” - to meet the 
demand for currency in circulation, to clear interbank balances and to 
meet the requirements for the minimum reserves that have to be 
deposited with the central bank. Given its monopoly over the creation 
of base money, the central bank is in a position to exert a dominant 
influence on money market conditions and thereby steer money 
market interest rates. Changes in money market rates in turn affect 
other market interest rates, albeit to varying degrees. This mechanism 
of tampering with money market conditions and in particular with 
interest rates inevitably sets the stage for the processes of forced 
saving, the boom-bust cycle and recurring recessions. This 
observation remains valid even if the central bank adopts as its 
primary objective the maintenance of price stability. 
In line with the way inflation actually operates in 
contemporary central banking systems, it can at first be assumed that 
an additional supply of money is created by a deliberate policy move 
by the monetary authority, for instance by an injection of bank 
reserves through an open market purchase. If additions to the money 
supply are made through open market operations, new reserves arrive 
at those banks who sell securities. As a result these banks now have 
additional reserves to lend out, and these additional reserves will 
cause banks to lower the rates of interest they are charging in order to 
attract additional borrowers for those additional reserves, increasing 
the level of investment. At the lower market rate, investors will be 
more interested in borrowing and longer-term investment projects in 
particular will be more attractive at the new rate. However, because 
the time-preferences of consumers have not changed, there is no 
reason to expect that ex ante savings will have changed. The 
additional borrowing that is taking place is not being financed by the 
voluntary savings of the public. Inflation thus creates an 
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intertemporal discoordination, that is to say a mismatch between the 
time-preferences of the public and the cost of funds faced by 
investors. Ex ante investment is greater than ex ante savings but 
since ex post investment must equal ex post savings, the total amount 
of ex post savings is greater than what the public voluntarily wishes to 
save. The difference is referred to as forced savings. It is important to 
realize that even though forced savings provide the resources 
necessary to undertake the inflation-driven investments, they cannot 
render the ensuing capital structure sustainable because the savings 
are not reflective of the actual time-preferences of the actors from 
whom the savings have been involuntarily extracted. 
The ways in which the recipients of the excess supplies of money 
decide to dispose of their excess real balances will begin a process of 
relative price disruption. Such injection effects will also matter for the 
intertemporal price structure. Credit expansion - or the lending of 
money into existence - sets into motion a process of capital 
restructuring which is at odds with the unchanged intertemporal 
preferences of economic agents and which is therefore ultimately ill-
fated. Because of the mismatch between intertemporal production 
decisions and preferred intertemporal consumption patterns, the 
boom will be revealed as unsustainable. The changes in the 
intertemporal structure of production are self-defeating. Resource 
scarcities and a continuing high demand for current consumption 
eventually turn boom into bust. Therefore a centralized banking 
system can be expected to generate a higher degree of intertemporal 
discoordination and macroeconomic instability – and therefore also a 
higher rate of accompanying waste – than a decentralized banking 
system, in particular a banking system operating on the basis of a 
100-percent reserve requirement.
Higher degrees of intertemporal discoordination and 
macroeconomic instability beget higher rates of waste. In the process 
of lengthening and then shortening of the structure of production, as 
occurs in the course of a Hayekian cycle, what could have been 
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produced to satisfy human needs, had the malinvestments not taken 
place, and had the monetary expansion not discoordinated the 
interdependent plans of market participants, is lost forever. Errors 
cannot be corrected costlessly.
Is this theory still relevant for the understanding of real-world 
events? Today´s economists generally accept that the factors 
underlying business cycles have a variety of origins, of both a 
demand- and a supply-related nature, but they also increasingly 
recognize that these may well include Austrian aspects. It may be that 
Austrian factors have become more important with the changes in the 
international financial system of the past twenty years. Increasingly 
mobile capital flows now quickly seek out investment projects that are 
perceived to provide the most attractive returns. The Japanese boom 
and bust of the 1980s and 1990s is an example of a recent cycle with 
Austrian characteristics. The upturn of this cycle was driven by strong 
expansions of money and credit, which fueled a level and direction of 
investment that was unsustainable. In the aftermath, businesses 
suffered from chronic overcapacity, and long-term declines in 
corporate profitability led to a sharp deterioration of banks´ loan 
portfolios. Moreover, the traditional Keynesian policy approach of 
demand stimulation was unsuccessful in bringing the economy out of 
recession. In fact repeated injections of liquidity by the Bank of Japan 
have worked to delay the necessary restructuring effort. (see also 
Oppers 2002) 
The previous considerations elucidate some of the reasons why 
some authors have considered that the theorists of the Chicago School 
are guilty of naiveté in ascribing to governments the desire and ability 
to administer a stable monetary policy under all circumstances. (see 
e.g. Huerta de Soto 2006, 735)  This naiveté was also apparent in 
Becker´s original 1956 paper in which he arrived at the conclusion
that a government monopoly of the currency issue is preferable to 
decentralization in banking and currency competition.
17
In fact, the foregoing considerations entitle us to reject not only 
Beckers original proposal for a government monopoly of the currency 
issue but also Selgins and Whites agnostic attitude with respect to 
the desirable base money regime, and to adopt instead a presumption 
in favor of (1) decentralization in banking and thus the elimination of 
a centralized monetary authority such as a central bank and (2) a 
monetary standard or base money regime based on specie, in 
particular a gold standard. As Ludwig von Mises used to point out, the 
decisive advantage of a commodity standard – such as a gold standard 
– is that it makes the increase in the supply of the commodity depend 
upon the profitability of producing it. (e.g. Mises 1998, 471) 
Moreover Ludwig von Mises views about free banking were still
closer to certain classical definitions of freedom in banking, as they 
were stated in the nineteenth century, in particular in the writings of 
authors like Charles Coquelin and Henri Charles Carey. These 
classical views are well synthesized in a separate contribution to the 
Festschrift authored by Antoine Gentier. (ibid. 251-264) According to 
these conceptions, the idea of a government monopoly of the printing 
of currency or notes is considered contrary to the very essence of a 
genuine free banking system. 
IV. Is fractional-reserve banking to be considered an industry like any 
other? 
The proposition that banking in general is to be considered an 
industry like any other can be acknowledged as accurate provided it is 
correctly interpreted, that is, if it is understood in the following sense:
There are no reasons not to subject the business of banking to the 
same general rules of conduct as those to which other kinds of 
business are subject. The question then remains what exactly those 
rules are. Finding a generally acceptable answer to this latter question 
constitutes the real source of controversy in this domain.
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Beckers rejection of the 100-percent reserve schemes is based on his 
belief that the 100-percent reserve rule constitutes an instance of 
“overregulation” or an “undesirable regulation” of the banking
industry. This rejection clearly places him outside of the mainstream 
in monetary and banking matters within the Chicago School. The Old 
Chicago-School tradition of support for a 100-percent reserve 
requirement can be associated with names of theorists such as Henry 
C. Simons, Albert G. Hart and James W. Angell, among others. Irving 
Fisher compiled these proposals in book form in his 100 Percent 
Money. 7 The trend finally culminated in the publication of Milton 
Friedmans already mentioned A Program for Monetary Stability in 
1959. The 100-percent fiat standard as proposed by Irving Fisher and 
continued by the Chicago School must be distinguished from the 
proposals of the hard money school, however. Both schools differ in 
emphasis and fundamental philosophy. The Chicago School views the 
100-percent money proposal as a “technique”, that is to say an 
efficient, useful tool of the government in controlling the money supply 
and eliminating the inherent instability of fractional-reserve banking, 
due to lags or friction in the banking system. The return to 100-
percent specie in contrast is regarded as a return to the free market in 
money and the full restoration of property rights for depositors. 
It will further be noted that business cycle effects can be generated by 
the 100-percent fiat reserve standard as well as by a fractional-reserve 
banking system. Jess Huerta de Soto summarized his assessment of 
the Chicago School proposals very well when he wrote:
“However, in general, Chicago theorists have defended a 100-percent
reserve banking system for exclusively practical reasons, believing this 
requirement would make government monetary policy easier and more 
predictable. Therefore the theorists of the Chicago School have been 
guilty of naivet in ascribing to governments the desire and ability to 
administer a stable monetary policy under all circumstances.” (2006, 
734-735) 
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Becker believes that his proposal, when compared with the 
Friedman-style 100-percent scheme, is superior in at least two 
respects. First, whereas the 100-percent reserve scheme is thought to 
take government intervention out of the industry of lending and 
borrowing, his scheme goes further in that it also takes government
intervention out of the checking deposit industry. Therefore, on the 
grounds of minimizing direct government control his proposal is 
thought to be desirable. (ibid. 233) Second, whereas the 100-percent 
scheme means that there will be freely determined reserve ratios for 
all private obligations other than checking deposit liabilities, his own 
scheme does not treat checking deposits differently from other short 
run assets and thus makes no artificial distinction between checking 
deposits and other short run assets. His own scheme says that there 
will be freely determined reserve ratios for all private liabilities. There 
will nevertheless be 100-percent reserves against notes, the issue of 
which would be a government monopoly. (ibid. 233-234)
Both alleged virtues of Beckers scheme are illusory, however. 
Beckers first point is question-begging since it assumes what has to 
be rendered plausible in the first place, namely that the act of creating 
checking deposits out of nothing – which constitutes the normal
activity of the checking deposit industry but which at the same time is 
a modality of money creation - constitutes an act of normal business 
essentially similar to any other kind of honest business, that is, acts 
of the same order as, say, selling a product or a service. As Austrian 
theorists have pointed out repeatedly and consistently, there are 
important reasons for not considering the act of creating money ex 
nihilo as an act of the same order as, say, selling a product or any 
other kind of normal and honest business acts. But then, and so long 
as (some degree of) government intervention in the domain of law 
enforcement is taken for granted, that is, so long as law enforcement 
has not been completely privatized, a (second-best) case can be made 
for government intervention in the checking deposit industry, in 
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particular by imposing a 100-percent reserve requirement, be it only 
as an imperfect and temporary solution. The concept of “regulation” 
and therefore also those of “de-regulation” and “over-regulation” 
undeniably exhibit a certain ambiguity. In a world characterized by an 
almost universal (but disputable) recognition of the legitimacy of 
fractional-reserve banking, imposing a 100-percent reserve 
requirement in banking may at first seem to constitute a step towards 
more regulation and thus appear as a move away from the principles 
underlying the functioning of a free, unhampered market society.8
Advocates of such a 100-percent reserve requirement will point out, 
however, that this cannot be true, for by and large the same reasons
that, say, a state-enacted law forbidding certain forms of theft and 
fraud could not possibly constitute a move away from the legal and/or 
ethical principles of a free market society. If imposing a 100-percent 
reserve requirement may indeed appear as a form of “regulation”, then 
it is a form of regulation which actually restores to operation a free 
market principle, even if on the other hand the concept of “regulation”, 
in most of its ordinary uses, has usually the opposite connotation of a 
move away from the free market, and actually, of a violation of free 
market principles.  
As regards the second point, it is not correct to stipulate that 
the distinction between checking deposits on the one hand and short 
run assets on the other is an artificial one, or that it is not really 
important. The act of creating checking deposits out of nothing for a 
certain amount is an act of money creation for the same amount. 
Checking deposits, being redeemable into base money at par and 
upon demand, constitute readily available purchasing power for the 
market participants who hold these deposits. In this respect their 
status is similar to that of actual depositors, that is, market 
participants who actually made a shift from holding money in the 
form of currency to holding money in the form of checking deposits, 
thus modifying only the form in which they dispose of money, and 
without ever giving up any readily available purchasing power in the 
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process of performing this shift. On the other hand such a shift 
between currency and checking deposits – and in particular a shift 
from currency to deposits - is of course different from the act of 
creating the checking deposits out of nothing since in and by itself a 
shift from currency to deposits subject to check is not directly an act 
of money creation. In a different sense such a shift is no less different, 
however, from the act of creating a short run liability or of acquiring a 
short term asset. A market participant who grants a loan to a bank 
and who acquires a short term asset in exchange at least temporarily 
gives up an amount of readily available purchasing power. We can 
thus see that Beckers proposal for a regime of banking with fractional 
reserves, no less than all other proposals for fractional-reserve 
banking, has to involve an attempt to obliterate the unbridgeable 
conceptual gulf between deposit arrangements and loan 
arrangements. Since a fundamental distinction between loan 
arrangements and deposit arrangements has traditionally been 
sanctioned and vindicated by general legal principles, the case for 
fractional-reserve banking is particularly uneasy from the legal-
theoretical perspective.9
V. Is there any need for some overall countercyclical policy under free 
banking?
Under Beckers proposal for free banking a shift between 
currency and checking deposits – and even if one is free to consider 
that such a shift does not in and by itself constitute a change in the 
money supply - may have an (indirect) effect on the stock of money, 
and thus also on economic activity.
The point is clearly acknowledged by Becker himself since he writes:
“For example, shifting from time deposits or from the granting of book 
credit affects the firms with these short run liabilities. Their cash 
reserves will generally only be a small fraction of their total short run 
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liabilities. If their creditors demand cash the reserves will be run 
down, and to some extent this probably will force them to contract 
their lending (or spending as the case may be). Consequently there 
will be depressive effects on income and employment.” (ibid. 231)
Beckers proposed system would thus not be free from what one 
author has recently characterized as “the perils of base money”. 
(Yeager 2001) As Yeager reminds, inflations and deflations and the 
attendant disruptions of economic calculation and coordination have 
been mainly phenomena of base money and its manner of injection 
and withdrawal. (ibid. 260)
Becker also considers the possibility of introducing a system of 
government insurance of bank deposits so that banking panics such 
as the one that occurred during the Great Depression would be 
prevented but he rejects such a proposal as undesirable because of 
“the desire to get the government out of the banking business.” (ibid. 
232) In conjunction with his rejection of government-backed deposit 
insurance schemes, Becker conjectures that “[a]n effective general 
countercyclical policy would probably be sufficient to prevent any 
large scale panic.” (ibid. 233) It is thus supposed that general 
countercyclical activity of the government will succeed in keeping 
within tolerable limits both bank failures due to panicky attempts to 
convert deposits into currency and failures of other kinds of firms.
How should Beckers rejection of government deposit insurance 
be evaluated? Both at the theoretical level (see Diamond and Dybvig 
1983) and from a historical perspective the force of the argument in 
favor of government deposit insurance should not be underestimated.
As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 11) remind us, writing about the 
Great Contraction:
“In banking, the major change was the enactment of federal deposit 
insurance in 1934. This probably has succeeded, where the Federal 
Reserve Act failed, in rendering it impossible for a loss of public 
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confidence in some banks to produce a widespread banking panic 
involving severe downward pressure on the stock of money; if so, it is 
of the greatest importance for the subsequent monetary history of the 
United States. Since the establishment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, bank failures have become a rarity.” 
And further:
“Adopted as a result of the widespread losses imposed by bank 
failures in the early 1930s, federal deposit insurance, to 1960 at 
least, has succeeded in achieving what had been a major objective of 
banking reform for at least a century, namely, the prevention of 
banking panics.” (ibid. 440) 
Following this account Beckers rejection of government deposit 
insurance and his endorsement of countercyclical policy instead seem 
questionable indeed. It will be noted, however, that the institution of 
a deposits insurance system entails problems of moral hazard 
(regulation failure). A banks depositors are guaranteed against loss, 
and therefore lose any incentive to monitor the management of the 
banks with which they keep their funds. The management need no 
longer worry about maintaining depositor confidence, and so they take 
more risks, run down the banks capital, and generally undermine the 
banks financial health. (Dowd 1996, 454-5)10
From this perspective Beckers rejection of government deposit 
insurance constitutes clear proof of prescience since he writes that 
“[i]f government insured they would necessarily influence reserve 
ratios, lending activity, etc.” (ibid. 232) It will be noted, however, that 
the institution of a lender of last resort has similar effects. A banks 
management can rely on the central bank to provide it with emergency 
loans, that is, loans it presumably could not obtain elsewhere in the 
market, or could only obtain at greater cost. The availability of such 
loans reduces the penalty to the bank for allowing its credit-
24
worthiness to deteriorate, and thereby implicitly encourages the bank 
to act in ways that promote such deterioration. (Dowd 1996, 454-5)
The economic rationale for countercyclical policy offered by 
Becker invites some further comment. This rationale is framed as an 
argument in terms of the necessity or at least the desirability of curing
(correcting) external effects:
“It is argued that when an individual shifts between currency and 
checking deposits he merely wishes to alter the form in which his 
“money” is held. But because of fractional reserve banking this shift 
affects the total stock of money, and hence prices and employment. 
Since the latter changes affect other individuals, there is an argument 
based on the discrepancy between social and private costs for 
government control of the effects of this shift. (…) More generally, any 
shift from goods or debt into currency imposes through the multiplier 
or velocity mechanisms social costs that are not completely borne by 
those doing the shifting. This, indeed, is the major argument for active 
government participation in fighting cyclical movements.” (ibid. 232)
Arguments for government intervention allegedly intended to 
cure the harm resulting from external effects had been made in this 
context before Becker. Vera Smith, in her rightly acclaimed book The 
Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative, 
mentions the case of general runs on the banks as one where 
uncompensated damage is inflicted by the guilty banks on their 
innocent rivals, and as such giving grounds for some kind of 
intervention along the lines suggested by Pigou in his Economics of 
Welfare. (Smith 1990, 187) 11 Apparently for Vera Smith too 100-
percent reserve banking is no alternative to be taken seriously since 
she writes that “no bank can be 100 percent liquid”. (ibid. 187)
Nevertheless the argument cannot be followed. We would today 
rather look for a solution in the direction of a more adequate definition 
and/or a more strict enforcement of property rights, that is, a re-
definition and/or a stricter enforcement of the fundamental “rules of 
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the game” rather than for a solution along Pigovian lines. Recent 
debates have in fact been framed in such terms. For instance the 
controversy between the fractional-reserve free bankers on the one 
hand and the advocates of a 100-percent reserve requirement in 
banking on the other is at bottom one pertaining to what constitutes 
an adequate definition and enforcement of property rights in banking. 
Any decision taken by any individual has consequences on 
some other individuals, which means that all the members of society 
are interdependent. But the fact that activities are interdependent 
does not mean that there are externalities. On cannot assume that 
externalities exist without having first determined who has the right to 
do what. (Salin 1988b, 294) If property rights are clearly defined, 
which means that one does know what each individual has the right 
to do and not to do, externalities do not exist. (ibid. 292) As Pascal 
Salin points out, the existence of externalities is mainly called for by 
people who would like others to behave as they wish. The word 
“externalities” is misleading, and we ought to speak rather of the 
absence of property rights and of legitimizing coercion. (ibid. 292)
But even if it were somehow possible to refer meaningfully to the 
existence of “externalities, it does not follow that governments are able 
to pursue a stabilization policy. Lacking the information on the 
working of the system, the preferences and targets of individuals, 
governments can take decisions only on the basis of a very simplified 
model of society. 
As Pascal Salin argues, besides the fact that the subject of 
macro-stabilization leads straight to the ethical problem of the desired 
frontier between the private sphere and the public sphere, there is no 
economic justification for macroeconomic stabilization policy, and 
there can be no “public good” argument for state macroeconomic 
stabilization. Macroeconomic stabilization problems are mainly 
information problems, but information is not a public good and it is 
always costly. Information is best provided by those who have an 
interest in providing it. If the concept of macroeconomic stabilization 
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has any meaning, it is best achieved in an environment of a 
decentralized decision-making process. The argument against 
macroeconomic stabilization is parallel to the one against central 
planning, which has been emphasized by the Austrian tradition. (Salin 
1990a) 12
The working of a free society implies or presupposes the 
definition of “general rules of conduct” which can partly be defined 
and sanctioned by an institution called “the state”. In his critique of 
the idea of macro-stabilization policies from a market process 
perspective Pascal Salin (1990a) concluded that individual 
stabilization and, therefore, macro-stabilization are made easier if 
these rules are stable and predictable. Therefore, the contribution of 
the state to macro-stabilization ought to be stabilization of the rules, 
the definition of which is its specific responsibility.” (ibid. 220)
The even more consequential argument against general 
countercyclical policy contrived to counteract cyclical movements of 
key economic variables, however, is that it can only add to the very 
evils it is supposed to cure. According to the Austrian theory of the 
business cycle which I have summarized, these cyclical movements 
and boom-bust cycles are themselves the inevitable consequences of 
money and credit expansion brought about by a centralized banking 
system operating under a regime of fractional reserves. The economic 
instability that is so characteristic of the actually existing capitalist 
economies is no “act of God”. The “generally bad times” to which 
Becker refers (ibid. 233) are not like “bad weather” due to the 
operation of uncontrollable natural forces, nor would such instability 
bedevil a truly unhampered market system free of government 
intervention in monetary and banking matters. The restoration of a 
100-percent reserve rule in banking, far from being a specific kind of 
unwarranted government intervention in the market as Becker 
suggests, would only subject the banking business to the general 
rules of conduct appropriate for a free society.     
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Nevertheless, past debates and discussions on how to conceive 
of adequate monetary arrangements from a market process 
perspective lead to the conclusion that some controversy 
(disagreement) in this domain is likely to subsist. Several scholars 
who have thought deeply about this question, including Pascal Salin, 
have favored a proposal for a free banking system based on fractional 
reserves. As this author has explained elsewhere (see van den Hauwe
2006) a different and arguably more effective way to achieve the result
of monetary arrangements that would favor a desirable degree of 
macroeconomic stability would consist in bringing about a complete
institutional separation of deposit banking from loan banking along 
the lines proposed by the advocates of a 100-percent reserve 
requirement in banking. Probably to some extent market forces could 
be relied upon in order to bring about this result.
Contrary to the allegation of Vera Smith a bank can indeed be 
100 percent liquid, in the sense that it can hold reserves against the 
total amount of its demand liabilities, i.e. the outstanding liabilities 
that are redeemable upon demand.
The 100-percent reserves proposal is criticized in Yeager (2001). 
Yeager criticizes first the idea that money is essentially a commodity 
valuable in itself. Subsequently he also points to the impracticality of 
100-percent reserves. He writes:
“Money evolved from directly useful commodities that proved 
convenient as intermediaries in indirect barter (Menger 1871/1950, 
chapter VIII and Appendix J, Menger 1892, Menger 
1892/1909/1970). To suppose, however, that the essence of a 
developed institution must remain specified by its genesis or earlies 
form is to commit the “genetic fallacy” (…). An example is to suppose, 
on historical grounds, that money is fundamentally or most properly a 
commodity valuable in itself, like gold or silver, and that if paper notes 
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and bank deposits have taken over its functions, these substitutes 
should at least be redeemable in real money.” (ibid. 255)
It is remarkable that Yeager refers extensively to Mengers views 
about the origin of money but mentions neither Ludwig von Misess 
monetary writings nor the regression theorem. It is an implication of 
the regression theorem, which Mises built as a theoretical insight 
upon Mengers historical account, that in the spontaneously or 
“naturally” developed monetary economy the definitive money is 
specie. A specie unit is also the unit of account. There is no 
spontaneous or market-driven path from this system to the non-
commodity or fiat standards that prevail today. 13
According to the regression theorem, money must arise in the 
manner described by Menger, that is to say it must develop out of a 
commodity already in demand for direct use, the commodity then 
being used as a more and more general medium of exchange. Demand 
for a good as a medium of exchange must be predicated on a 
previously existing array of prices in terms of other goods. Admittedly 
the regression theorem has not been universally convincing. In 
particular Walrasians such as Patinkin had suggested that the 
theorem is really superfluous. The controversy obviously also reflects 
distinct methodological approaches. Whereas Misess analysis is 
grounded in temporal cause and effect, the Walrasian approach 
exemplifies the method of simultaneous and mutual determination. 
In historical practice, a nations switch to fiat money was typically 
made by the central government first granting a legal monopoly of 
note-issue to a single institution, a central bank, whose liabilities 
became as widely accepted as specie, and displaced specie as the 
reserves for other banks. The government then suspended, 
permanently, the redemption of the central banks liabilities. With 
their permanent suspension, central bank notes and deposits became 
a fiat base money. The fiat-money unit correspondingly became the 
unit of account. The now-irredeemable notes can continue to circulate 
29
because they are familiar, and the practice of continuing to accept
them is self-reinforcing: it is not in any one trader´s self-interest to 
refuse them if he expects others to continue accepting them. 
But so what? One might conjecture that the regression theorem 
does not entail that a fiat money, once in existence, cannot go on to 
exist for extended or even very long periods of time - although 
probably at an ever-depreciating value - even without constant further 
government intervention. In this respect there seems to have arisen 
an extensive as well as a more restrictive interpretation of the 
implications of the regression theorem. According to one interpretation 
a deeper implication of the regression theorem points to an essential 
incompatibility between the unhampered market and fiat money. 
According to this view one can seriously doubt whether conceivably a 
fiat money could survive for extended periods of time on the 
unhampered market without constant further protection by further 
interventionism. 
This can be explained as follows. Commodity money enjoys a 
crucial competitive advantage over fiat money: commodity money is 
also used outside of indirect exchange. The fact that commodity 
money always commands a price on the market irrespective of how 
widespread it is used as money, provides a kind of insurance for the 
owners of commodity money: the purchasing power of their money 
never falls to zero because there will always be a non-monetary 
demand for it. Even if commodity money falls temporarily out of use 
as money, it can always spontaneously re-emerge as a medium of 
exchange, since market participants can rely on its present non-
monetary market prices to speculate about its future purchasing 
power.
Fiat money to the contrary has by definition no other than 
monetary uses. If the demand for it fades away so that it is even 
momentarily driven out of circulation, it disappears forever; it can 
never be re-introduced again on the market because there are no 
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market prices anymore that could serve as a basis for speculations 
about its future purchasing power. This represents a fatal competitive 
disadvantage of fiat money. There will therefore be a strong incentive 
for all market participants to switch to any kind of commodity money 
rather than remain exposed to the risks of fiat money. The only way in 
which this can be prevented is by the creation of an artificial demand 
for fiat money through government intervention, for instance, by 
requiring taxes to be paid in fiat money, or by legal tender laws forcing 
market participants to accept payments in fiat money. (Hlsmann
2000, 429) This line of argumentation regarding the essential 
incompatibility of fiat money and the free market economy has a 
certain plausibility but clearly it cannot be put directly to the test, and 
it can be expected to fuel some further controversy.
Furthermore, and contrary to Yeagers allegation, no genetic 
fallacy is involved. A genetic fallacy is a line of “reasoning” in which a 
perceived defect in the origin of a thing or claim is taken to be 
evidence that discredits the thing or claim itself. The genetic fallacy 
is a general fallacy of irrelevancy involving the origins or history of an 
idea or thing. It is fallacious to either endorse or condemn an idea or 
thing based on its past, rather than on its present merits or demerits, 
unless its past in some way affects its present meaning or value. The 
genetic fallacy is committed whenever an idea or thing is evaluated 
based upon irrelevant history.
However, the theoretician is interested not so much in the 
concrete past history of fractional-reserve free banking in view of 
evaluating it, but rather in the abstract theoretical question 
concerning the kind of forces which can, in general, be expected to 
sustain this type of institution. It is an interesting theoretical 
question, for instance, whether and to what extent an institution like 
fractional-reserve banking can (or cannot) be conceptualized as the 
outcome of an invisible-hand process. Such exercises need involve no 
genetic fallacy of any sort. From a purely theoretical viewpoint it is 
relevant and interesting to investigate to what extent a particular 
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institution tends to be self-sustaining or not, and in general, what 
kind of forces can be expected to sustain it.
With respect to the institution of fractional-reserve banking in 
particular one might then arrive at the conclusion that any attempt at
an adequate understanding of its origins, the conditions of its 
existence and subsistence etc. should adequately take into account 
the roles of lender-of-last-resort institutions, of government deposit 
insurance schemes, of government-imposed legal measures curtailing 
the rights of depositors etc. The point of interest is thus not merely 
factual and historical but theoretical; it relates to the possible origins
of various monetary institutions, and to the general conditions of their 
existence and subsistence.14
Yeager, however, complains that moneys history supports 
misconceptions about its role in the modern world. (ibid. 255)
It will be noted that the crucial question is not whether commodity 
money fits “the modern world”. The question is rather which kind of 
money fits a free world. The history of the modern world is the history 
of a succession of unwarranted government intrusions and 
transgressions in monetary matters.
Yeagers objections against base money are to some degree well-
founded but they do not carry over to a 100-percent commodity 
standard. Advocates of a 100-percent commodity standard do not 
construct their argument in terms of “base money” or in terms of a 
distinction between “outside money” and “inside money”. The only 
conceptual distinction which is made and which is needed in this 
respect is the distinction between money and money titles. (Hoppe 
2006) However, a money title cannot be identical to the money which 
it represents and thus it is not, in and by itself, money. The 
phenomena Yeager characterizes as “the perils of base money” arise at 
first only when we move towards a fractional-reserve regime.15
Yeager now points to a further problem: the impracticality of 
100-percent reserves. It is objected that such a proposal is not 
realizable or cannot be implemented. One has to distinguish a claim 
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concerning the alleged impracticality of a commodity money from a 
claim concerning the alleged impracticality of 100-percent reserves. As 
regards the former, many examples can be cited of fairly long-
continued and successful producers of private moneys convertible into 
specie. (Friedman and Schwartz 1987, 507) Furthermore, as I have 
pointed out, the regression theorem rather tends to suggest that in a 
free society anything except commodity money would be impracticable.
But Yeagers claim concerns more particularly the impracticality of 
100-percent reserves requirement. This is an odd objection. Why 
would a 100-percent reserve requirement be more difficult to impose 
and enforce than any of the other fundamental rules of conduct that 
are essential to a free society, once it can be assumed that the 
political will to enforce it is not in doubt?  Yeager himself points out 
that “[h]istory shows that incentives to evade a 100-percent-reserve 
requirement are powerful” (ibid. 256); that is surely true but so have 
been the incentives for governments to go to war, to tax their citizens
etc.
It can nevertheless be conceded that from a historical point of 
view, Yeagers objection is not entirely impertinent. One circumstance
that may help explain the historically rather constant tendency 
towards the development of fractional-reserve banking relates to the 
problematic character of bearer money certificates under a 100-
percent reserve commodity standard. Under a 100-percent reserve 
commodity standard money certificates payable to bearer are clearly 
problematic. The reason is that it becomes impossible for the issuing 
bank to effectuate a correct imputation of the fee due for safekeeping 
and custody. Market participants who receive such money certificates 
will spend them almost immediately while it is not possible for the 
bank to charge them with a fee for the safekeeping of the commodity 
for the period of time during which they held the certificates in their 
cash balances. On the other hand the person who would decide to 
redeem such a certificate will not agree to pay the fee for safekeeping 
corresponding to the entire period during which the certificate has 
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been circulating since he may have been holding the certificate in his 
cash balance for only a very limited period of time. Either the 
certificate will circulate at a discount, which may discourage some
market participants to redeem any such certificates - and this will 
counteract the tendency for certificates to return to the issuing bank 
which in turn will lessen the risk of banking with a fractional reserve -
or else the bank will find itself in the impossibility to charge anyone 
with a fee for safekeeping. In such circumstances deposit banking 
threatens to become an unprofitable business altogether. It comes as 
no surprise, then, that deposit banks found in the practice of 
fractional-reserve banking a profitable solution to this problem 
created by money certificates payable to bearer. Fractional-reserve 
banking restores profitability and allows the banking business to offer 
an acceptable return again. This is the explanation behind the 
observation that has sometimes been made that the genesis of 
fractional-reserve banking and the widespread use of money 
certificates payable to bearer tend to go together. The point made 
here, however, is mainly of historical relevance since the possibilities 
offered today by electronic banking, such as real-time payment – one 
thinks of e-gold - eliminate the need for circulating certificates and 
allow the imputation problem to be solved.
On the positive side, it can easily be shown that whereas the 
deflationary pressures which Becker correctly identifies are indeed 
endogenous in the context of a fractional-reserve banking system, 
these same tendencies would naturally disappear under a commodity 
standard functioning on a 100-percent reserve requirement. Money 
that is not created out of thin air does not disappear as snow before 
the sun. The considerable elasticity of the money stock which is so 
characteristic of a fractional-reserve system is a feature absent from a 
100-percent gold standard. According to the alternative theory of the 
business cycle developed by the economists of the Austrian School, 
general countercyclical policies, and in particular policies involving 
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monetary and credit expansion, will only worsen the evils they are 
supposed to cure.
We have thus come full circle. Beckers aim is apparently to 
remove as much as possible any unwarranted government 
intervention from the monetary and banking system and at the same 
time to contrive a cure for the cyclical movements experienced by 
capitalist societies. A 100-percent reserve requirement in banking 
would on the one hand subject the banking business to the same 
general rules of conduct as those to which all other business activities 
are to be subjected in a free society, and it would at the same time 
render general countercyclical policies superfluous since it would at 
once remove one of the major causes – probably the major cause – of 
cyclical instability in the economy.
Conclusion
As early as 1956, Gary Becker acknowledged the fact that 
fractional-reserve banking does not constitute “the best of all possible 
(monetary) worlds” since he believed that it should be complemented 
by general countercyclical policy to combat depressions and inflations 
and to prevent any large scale banking panics .
This viewpoint, as it emanated from an otherwise well known 
“free market” economist, was somewhat remarkable – not to say 
almost anomalous – in at least two respects. First, the occurrence of 
boom-bust cycles, including recessions and depressions, and of 
generally good and bad times etc. was apparently not conceptualized 
by Becker as the outcome of unwarranted government intervention in 
the economy. On the contrary these phenomena were considered 
endogenous in an otherwise free society and the government has to 
intervene in order to cure these evils. This view contrasts sharply with 
the view of Austrians who have consistently put the blame for the 
appearance of recurring cyclical instability (business cycles) in the 
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economy on institutional factors, and in particular on government-
backed monetary and credit expansion by a centralized banking 
system operating under fractional reserves. Beckers fundamental 
worldview as manifested in the 1956 paper was thus one according to 
which “the market fails”. Such a worldview is actually more akin to 
the Keynesian conceptualization than to the view of economists 
commonly designated as “pro-free-market”, whether they belong to the 
so-called Austrian School or to the so-called Chicago School, and who 
would rather conceptualize the unhampered market as a 
“spontaneous order”. 
Second, Becker stigmatized the 100-percent reserve 
requirement in banking as a specific kind of government intervention 
in the economy instead of recognizing it as the normal application to 
the business of banking of the same legal principles which underlie 
the free society in general.  
In the new introduction to his 1956 paper on free banking 
written especially for the Festschrift in honor of Pascal Salin, Becker 
repudiates or mitigates some of his previous conclusions concerning 
the feasibility of private bank money. This event has offered us a
fitting occasion to review how considerably our thinking about free 
banking has evolved in the past 50 years and also to add a few 
comments about “the state of the art” concerning the characteristics 
of an acceptable notion of free banking. Contrary to his original 1956 
opinion Becker now recognizes that there are no convincing reasons to 
consider a government monopoly of the currency or note supply an 
essential ingredient of free banking. Fee banking is indeed essentially 
decentralized banking and any such monopoly is incompatible with 
truly free banking.
Under a decentralized banking regime based on a 100-percent 
reserve requirement and on the possibility for market participants to 
redeem money titles in a commodity money such as gold not only 
would the equilibrium price level be finite but the “perils of base 
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money” as manifested by inflations followed by recessions and 
depressions would be practically non-existent.
Part of the explanation for the “anomalies” in Beckers original 
1956 paper can probably be provided by referring to “the spirit of the 
age”. The moment at which this paper was written predates the 
demise of Keynesianism and the revival of the Austran school, as well 
as the rational-expectations approach and the Public Choice 
revolution in economic science. Today we would naturally be less 
inclined to take the potential effectiveness of general countercyclical 
policy for granted as well as more thoughtful concerning the true 
causes of depressions and inflations.
Ludwig van den Hauwe
Notes
1 See Laine M. and G. Hlsmann (eds.) (2006).
2 For a profile of the French Professor, see in particular Hlsmann
(2007).
3 See e. g. Salin (1990b). The Festschrift contains a full bibliography of 
Pascal Salin, see Laine M. and G. Hlsmann (eds.) (ibid.) pp. 17-43. 
The Festschrift also contains several other contributions about 
freedom in money and banking, see in particular Centi (2006), Gentier 
(2006) and Nataf (2006).
4 White (1999) contains an excellent survey of these developments, 
except only for the theory of a 100-percent reserve requirement. The 
standard reference on the latter is now Huerta de Soto (2006a).
5 It is not even clear that we need a concept of “base money” or a 
conceptual distinction between “inside money” and “outside money”. 
The proposal for a system based on a 100-percent reserve requirement
is not based on the distinction between inside money and outside 
money. It does involve, however, a different distinction, namely that 
between money and money titles. 
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6 One kind of proposal that has been made is to delegate monetary 
policy to an independent central banker who is conservative in the 
sense of placing a higher relative weight on inflation stabilization than 
does society as a whole. Another type of proposal consists in 
contriving an optimal incentive contract for a central banker who 
responds to monetary incentives. See M. Obstfeld and K. Rogoff (2002) 
and the literature cited there. 
7 For the Fisher proposal see Fisher, I. ([1935] 1997); on the Chicago 
plan see, among others, Angell (1935), Hart (1935), Graham (1936), 
Simons (1936). See also the survey in Huerta de Soto (2006), 731-35. 
8 Apparently this was also Pascal Salins view; see his 1990b, p. 150. 
Pascal Salin writes regarding M.N. Rothbards 100-percent reserve 
proposal:  Certains auteurs – tels Murray Rothbard (par exemple 
dans The Mystery of Banking (…)) – qui sont de vigoureux adversaries 
de lintervention tatique se rallient pourtant  cette proposition. 
9 The definitive treatment of these legal-theoretic issues is now to be 
found in Huerta de Soto (2006a); see in particular Chapters I-III.  
10 The banking crisis in the USA during the 1980s demonstrated the 
conflict of interest that arose between commercial banks and 
regulators. The FDIC - the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation -
used to offer almost a de facto full insurance whose premium was not 
priced according to the risk exposure of the banking institution but as 
a percentage of deposits (these rules have been changed in 1991). 
Under that scheme a commercial bank on the edge of bankruptcy had 
an incentive to take even more risk given that the losses would fall on 
the insurance system and the benefits on the stockholders. Given that 
conflict of interest and the cost associated in terms of expensive 
bailouts, capital requirement has been considered as a solution to 
screen bank risk exposure. Bank capital adequacy regulation entails 
problems of its own, however, and thus offers no adequate solution 
either. 
11 The British economist Arthur C. Pigou first developed the basis for 
the concept of a Pigovian tax (or subsidy); see his (1920). Pigou 
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explained that in case the marginal social net product (including 
externalities) is different from the marginal private net product (net 
products are the results in the output of marginal resource increases), 
a tax or bounty (subsidy), depending on the sign of the difference, can 
be implemented to minimize the difference. There is only one tax or 
bounty for each externality that can lead to the optimum effect, that 
is, the equalization of the marginal private and social net product.
12 This subject is also treated in a contribution to the Festschrift by 
Jess Huerta de Soto (2006b), pp. 330-40. 
13 I here assume that the reader is familiar with the regression 
theorem. I nevertheless remind that Ludwig von Mises presented his 
so-called “regression theorem” in 1912 (Mises 1981, 129-46) as an 
answer to the “circularity problem” that thwarted prior attempts to 
apply marginal utility analysis to the value-of-money problem. The 
circularity problem thus arises from the fact that on the one hand we 
resort to individual value scales and demand schedules in order to 
explain the formation of money prices on the market, while on the 
other hand every time a unit of money enters in an individuals value 
scale it will do so in virtue of its marginal utility, that is its 
serviceability in exchange rather than in direct use, or purchasing 
power, which itself presupposes or depends upon an already given 
structure of money prices for the various goods. Mises argued that 
although the value of money today (in the sense of purchasing power 
or price on the market) depends upon todays demand for money 
(todays marginal utilities of money and of goods expressed in demand 
schedules), todays demand (marginal utility) in turn depends, not on 
the value of money today, but on its value (purchasing power) 
yesterday. The value of money yesterday serves as a proxy for todays 
expected value. As we regress backwards in time, we must eventually 
arrive at the original point when people first began to use gold as a 
medium of exchange. On the first day on which people passed from 
the system of pure barter and began to use gold as a medium of 
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exchange, the money price, or rather, the gold price, of every other 
good depended partially on the marginal utility of gold. 
See also Rothbard [2004] 268-76. According to most authors working 
in the Walrasian monetary tradition there really is no circularity.
14 Could it not be objected that the question of whether a particular
institution can possibly emerge as the outcome of a market-driven 
process or not, is irrelevant? This claim is overdrawn. From a 
theoretical perspective the question of which forces sustain a 
particular institutional phenomenon is obviously a relevant and
interesting one. One reason for an interest in this sort of questions is 
in view of the (comparative) cost-benefit assessment of different 
institutional forms. If a particular institutional form is not self-
sustaining, then attempts at nevertheless installing and sustaining it, 
for instance through some deliberate concerted effort by the 
government or a political authority, might come at a high cost (and 
even then prove ultimately impossible to sustain). Even if interaction 
patterns that are only sustainable (and sustained) by political 
mechanisms, deliberate intervention in the market etc., will often be 
more costly, this fact will not always be clearly perceived to the extent 
that political mechanisms will often tend to conceal some of the 
implied costs. Often the gains will be more visible - since 
particularized towards specific groups - than some of the costs - that 
may be spread over the population at large etc. Public choice analysis 
and the rent-seeking literature are of course particularly relevant in 
this context. The groups that benefit from particular 
interventions/regulations have an interest in concealing the necessary 
link between these interventions/regulations and their 
undesired/undesirable side effects and thus in influencing the very 
perception of both the nature of the problems that arise and their 
possible solutions. 
15 Yeager writes with respect to the Selgin-White proposal: “Still, such 
a system would have the disadvantage of a distinct base money and 
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the probable disadvantage of a unit defined by gold in particular.” 
(ibid. 258)
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